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ABSTRACT
Because the Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) nodes are low-cost devices, attackers may capture some nodes in this network and
then duplicate these nodes to eavesdrop the transmitted messages or even control the network gradually without difficulty. This
is the so-called node replication attack. This type of attacks could cause the huge threat to information security of WSNs.
Therefore, in this paper, we would like to suggest a detection approach which can offer good performance but with higher energy
consumption. Hence, it can provide an alternative solution for some specific applications that need better precision but do not
care energy or lifespan too much.
Keywords: Mobile Wireless Sensor Network, Network Security, Node Replication Attack Detection, LEACH-ME Routing
Protocol, Performance Evaluation.
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INTRODUCTION
The WSN is composed of many wireless sensor nodes. This kind of network is often used in various scenarios such as battlefield,
animal detection, sea water temperature collection, etc. Wireless sensor nodes could be self-configuring and self-maintaining
with mobility or not. Furthermore, WSN nodes are often made with low-cost and less-security consideration because the
deployment of WSN may need thousands of sensor nodes or more most of the time. For some particular applications, sensor
nodes are also deployed in the huge open space so it may be very difficult in general to guarantee the safety of each node. These
situations results in various kinds of threats to the secure operation of WSN.
Due to the characteristics of WSN, it may suffer from many kinds of attacks such as sinkhole attack, Sybil attack, wormhole
attack, node replication attack and so on (Padmavathi & Shanmugapriya, 2009; Wang et al., 2006). Even though most of threats
and attacks can be effectively prevented by using cryptographic algorithms; however, they are not suitable for WSNs due to the
lightweight design of sensor nodes. In this paper, we would like to focus on node replication attack and provide a solution. As for
node replication attack, the malicious attackers can capture one sensor node and then duplicate this node with many copies easily.
These nodes can be deployed within the huge WSN and finally eavesdrop important messages transmitted in the network.
Therefore, how to detect the node replication attack becomes one of the most important issues for information security of WSNs.
Considering the potential damage caused by node replication attack, the suitable detection methods are really necessary for the
future development of applications of WSN. There are lots of replication node detection approaches that had been proposed in
the past. However they may only function well in different environments. Some methods work better for static nodes and some
others can just be used for centralized infrastructure with superior performance. Nevertheless, we believe there is still room for
improvement.
Because the transmission route of each node is different, the uneven energy dissipation may cause the lifetime decrease of WSN
node. Therefore the Low-Energy Adaptive Clustering Hierarchy (LEACH) routing protocol was proposed to reduce the energy
dissipation for longer use of nodes (Heinzelman et al., 2000). LEACH is a cluster-based routing protocol with the major
consideration of saving energy; therefore, nodes are not always in the active state. Furthermore, LEACH protocol was initially
designed for static nodes. In general, static nodes are easier to handle but mobile nodes play well than static nodes for many new
applications. Hence, in this paper, we propose the node replication detection method based on LEACH-Mobile-Enhanced
(LEACH-ME) protocol introduced in Kumar et al. (2008). The main purpose is to balance the energy consumption and detection
rate. We believe quite a few particular applications are tolerant of some sacrifices of power consumption in return for higher
detection rates.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Previous Solutions for Replication Attack
In the beginning, most of node replication detection methods relied on the Base Station (BS) to execute the centralized detection
algorithms. Each node sends identification information, mainly the location claim or a list of neighboring members, to the BS for
investigation. Then BS checks the received information and decides if there is a replication node. If the attacking situation
happens, then BS floods the warning message all over the network to revoke that node. However, this mechanism may have the
following disadvantages:
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1. If the BS can’t work properly, then this type of methods totally fails
2. The communication cost of centralized detection is really heavy
3. BS may become the bottleneck of whole infrastructure
To overcome the shortcomings of centralized detection, some scholars proposed local detection. They used voting mechanism to
verify if a node is duplicated within a neighborhood (Chan et al., 2003; Eschenauer & Gligor, 2002; Newsome et al., 2004). This
mechanism does not need BS but fails to detect clones that are far away from each other. And the communication cost of this
mechanism is also very high, since n floodings happen in the network in each iteration where n is the number of nodes in the
WSN.
The Detection of Node Replication Attack for Static Nodes
In Parno et al. (2005), they proposed two protocol that could use symmetric-key cryptography to recognize clone nodes
effectively rather than asymmetric-key cryptography. First one is the Randomized Multicast (RM) protocol. This protocol
chooses witness randomly. Due to the large number of nodes in WSNs, it is difficult for malicious one to guess which node is the
witness. When a node announces its location, its neighbor will forward the location claim to the witness. If a witness receives an
ID with different location claims, this witness will flood warning message all over the network to revoke that ID. Parno et al.
(2005) also proposed another protocol named as Line-Selected Multicast (LSM) that further lowers the communication cost.
After a node announces its location claim, its neighbor forwards the location claim to the randomly chosen witness. However, the
location claim will be stored in each node’s buffer along the forwarding path. And the replication node should be found at the
intersection of two lines as demonstrated in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Replication node is detected in the intersection of two lines for LSM algorithm (Parno et al., 2005)
Znaidi et al. (2009) proposed an algorithm for detecting node replication attack in hierarchical structure WSN. Bloom filter is
used in this mechanism for reducing the communication cost. This algorithm has an advantage that the length of the filter is
steady but it may increase the false positive rate (FPR).
Naruephiphat et al. (2012) provided Area-Based Clustering Detection (ABCD) method which combines the advantages of
centralized approach and clustering protocol. At the beginning, center node is chosen based on the maximum number of
neighboring nodes. Then the area around the center node is separated to several sub-areas. Nodes are evenly allocated in these
sub-areas and one node should be selected as witness. Each node ID and location claim must be forwarded to neighbors and then
a witness but this information must pass the center node. Therefore the center node can detect replication node with two different
location claim but the same ID.
Cheng et al. (2015) proposed a node replication detection algorithm with an improved LEACH (NI-LEACH) protocol to reduce
the energy dissipation of nodes. They used a set of monitor nodes to observe the processes of data transmission in the cluster to
check whether the data packet is tampered. The judgment algorithm is based on energy and covered range and NI-LEACH
protocol calculates an optimal number of clusters and provides a new equation to calculate the threshold value for cluster head
probability.
The Detection of Node Replication Attack for Mobile Nodes
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Yu et al. (2013) proposed two algorithms, Extremely Efficient Detection (XED) and Efficient Distributed Detection (EDD), for
detecting clone nodes in mobile WSN. The strength of these two methods is due to the localized detection, network-wide
synchronization avoidance and network-wide revocation avoidance. For XED, two mobile nodes exchange a random number
when they encounter each other first time. Then these two node can verify each other when they meet again. However, XED
cannot protect collusion of two nodes. EDD can be used for avoiding collusion by having counters in each node to count how
many times they meet each other. A threshold for these counters will be set for replication attack warning.
Another solution for mobile replication nodes detection in WSNs was proposed by Lee (2009). In this algorithm, any selected
node can initiate the review round by broadcasting R (t ) . R (t ) is a random number generated at time t . Any node α receives
this number at time T (α ) and this receiving time should be different for different node with very huge probability. This
information with ID will be forwarded to the randomly chosen witness with probability Pλ by neighbors and the witness is
responsible for replication node revocation.
PROPOSED DESIGN
To deal with the issues emphasized before, we design a node replication detection approach for mobile MSN operating on the
LEACH-ME routing protocol and it is partially similar to the one proposed in Lee (2009). However, our proposed method
delivers different authentication information and is working on different routing protocol. We also divide detection phase into
four steps. The notations used in the detection algorithm are listed in the following Table 1.
Table 1: The notations used in the detection algorithm
Notations

Cl
CH l

IDs
R (t )
T (CH l )
ll

Meanings
Cluster l
Cluster head of cluster l
ID of node s
Random number generated by sink at time t
Timestamp of CH l receiving detection request packet from sink

ml

Member list of cluster l
Mapping list for cluster head of cluster l recording ID-timestamp pair < IDx , T (CH y ) >

fi
H ( IDs )

A fixed interval for next detection cycle
A hash-function-based algorithm

The first step: the random number is broadcasted by sink
Detection phase is initiated by sink node in the beginning of one detection interval at time t . In general, it is often deployed
around the center of WSN and is also easy to reach all of the nodes. At first, a random number R (t ) is generated by sink node
at time t and then it uses broadcasting method to send detection request packet with R (t ) to all other cluster heads in the WSN
as shown in Figure 2.
C lu ster H ead
M em b er N o d e
S in k
C lu ster
R ep licatio n
N ode
B ro ad cast R (t)

G atew ay

Figure 2: Broadcast of R (t ) from sink node to cluster nodes
The second step: is broadcasting member list.
As a cluster head CH i receives the detection request packet, then CH i must decide which other cluster head CH j should be
multi-casted with the verification packet that includes its member list li , attached T (CH i ) and IDs of cluster head CH i .
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The destination cluster head CH j is decided by each node in the member list li using a well-designed hash-function-based
algorithm H ( IDs ) which is similar to the one proposed in Lee (2009). Each node should only map into one destination cluster
head. However, for the purpose of reducing communication cost, we should design the mapping algorithm with rather narrow
range which only selects several destination cluster heads (two or three are better). This is another major different consideration
between ours and the algorithm proposed in Lee (2009).
The third step: destination cluster head verifies all IDs in the list and timestamp in the received packet
When the cluster head CH j receives the verification packet from CH i , CH j should check if the IDs in the member list li
conflict with any ID in the ID-timestamp pair m j : < IDx , T (CH y ) > as shown in Figure 3. If any confliction occurs, then
jump to step four. If no confliction occurs, then CH j inserts li and T (CH i ) into m j . After verification is done, CH j
continues to wait for new verification packets.
C lu ster H ead
M em b er N o d e
S in k
C lu ster
R ep licatio n
N ode
G atew ay

CHi

C H i tra n sm it ID i , l i a n d T (C H i ) to
o th er c lu ste r h e ad th ro u g h g ate w a y .

Figure 3 CH j receives the verification packet and checks
The fourth step: cluster head broadcasts the replication node
When CH j finds any duplicate ID, then CH j broadcasts to other cluster heads to insert this malicious ID in the ban list and
also notify all the member nodes as shown in Figure 4. This node will not be included within the information interchange
network any more. After this revocation job is done, return to step 3 to continue.
CHj

C lu ste r H e a d
M em ber N ode
S in k
C lu ste r
R e p lic atio n
N ode
G a te w a y

C H j notices
rep licatio n n o d e
and broadcast
o th e r c lu s te r h e a d s
to b a n its ID .

Figure 4: CH j broadcasts to other cluster heads after detecting replication node
Sink node will start a new round of replication node detection again after a period of time fi passes, that is, will broadcast
R (t + fi ) to initiate next round.
SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Simulation Setup
We used Castalia framework as our simulation environment to evaluate energy dissipation, communication overhead and
detection rates for this proposed method. Castalia is known as a famous framework for simulating WSNs and used in Boulis
(2007). It is based on the popular simulator Omnet++. Omnet++ is coded in C++. Castalia has the complete radio modules of
WSN and is equipped with the convenient functions for data analysis and data collection such as CastalieResult and CastaliaPlot.
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Actually Castalia version 3.3 and Omnet++ version 4.6 were adopted and all the simulation parameters were set as the values
demonstrated in Table 2.
Table 2: The module used and the simulation parameters
Simulation Parameters
Values
Number of nodes
400 - 1000
Simulation Time
50 sec
Field
500m * 500m
Speed
2m / sec
Detection Interval
15 seconds
Eelec
50 Nano Joule / bit

ε elec
Repeat times
Probability of being selected as Cluster Head
Cluster Head Rotation Interval
TDMA slot length
Radio Module
Mobility Module

100 Pico Joule / bit / m 2
Each simulation repeats 100 times
5%
4 sec
0.2 sec
CC2420
Random Waypoint

All WSN nodes except the sink were deployed randomly and uniformly in the 500 m * 500 m square field. We set all nodes
except the sink node with mobility speed 2m/sec. Totally 27 replication nodes with 3 different IDs were inserted in the field for
each simulation.
Results and Discussion
The following figures demonstrate the simulation results of our approach and the detection algorithm proposed in Znaidi et al.
(2009) which is somewhat revised by us based on LEACH-ME protocol for the purpose of comparison. Our detection approach
is denoted as method 1 and method 2 represents the other compared approach.
Communication Overhead

Figure 5: Comparison of communication overhead
From Figure 5, we can observe that the communication overhead of method 1 is a little bit better than method 2. However, the
difference is not that significant. Furthermore, the communication cost of both methods increase exponentially with the number
of nodes.
Energy Dissipation
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Figure 6: Comparison of energy dissipation
From Figure 6, we notice that the energy dissipation of method 2 increases smoothly; however, method 1 increases quickly. We
think the better performance of method 2 is due to the adoption of Bloom filter for detection but takes the correction rate of
detection as sacrifice. Bloom filter is of fixed size, so the number of necessary bits for detection does not grow with the number
of nodes.
True Positive Rate (TPR)
The detection approaches of method 1 and method 2 are all based on the exchange of the member list. Hence, we cannot observe
the significant difference between these two as expected according to the results in Figure 7. We also find that the TPR grows as
the number of nodes. We believe that the increase of total nodes is beneficial for transmitting packets across the field even though
the larger number of nodes may cause the detection more difficult.

Figure 7: Comparison of true positive rates for two detection approaches
False Positive Rate (FPR)

Figure 8: Comparison of false positive rate for two detection approaches
It is noticed that there is a clear gap for FPR between method 1 and method 2 as demonstrated in Figure 8. We believe it is due to
the difference between detection processes. For our method, the ID of replication node is put into ban list directly but, for method
2, a cluster head needs to confirm the owner of received member list when it finds replication node ID in the Bloom filter.
Because of the mobility of nodes, the confirming process of method 2 may increase the false positive rate. Moreover, these two
methods have implicit but same trend as the number of nodes increases. It may be because two methods use the same original
positions for each simulation even though these nodes were randomly deployed.
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CONCLUSIONS
The main contribution of this paper is that we provide an alternative detection approach for node replication attack on
LEACH-ME routing protocol. The primary consideration of the proposed approach is to use timestamp suggested in Lee (2009)
and the member list as well but only their cluster heads are involved in the replication node detection process. Actually we
believe this method can be revised slightly in the future to avoid misjudging a legal node as replication node while a node leaves
one cluster but returns after just a while. Furthermore, the simulation results are provided to compare our approach with the one
proposed in Znaidi et al. (2009) and demonstrate the useful scenarios of the proposed method. From these results, they enhance
the original speculation that this approach is especially good for some particular applications which are tolerant of some
sacrifices of power consumption in return for higher detection rates.
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